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ABSTRACT  
   
The current landscape of political speech is ripe for deep philosophical analysis 
yet has not been thoroughly investigated through the lens of speech-act theory. In this 
space, I believe I contribute something novel to the area, namely a notion of campaign 
promises that differs from standard promises that enables a new way of interpreting this 
kind of speech. Over the course of this paper, it is argued that Campaign Promises (CP) 
are non-trivially and philosophically distinct from the notion of Standard Promises (SP). 
There are many philosophical distinctions to draw, including moral, political and logical, 
but my focus is largely in philosophy of language. I engage the work of Searle, Austin 
and Wittgenstein among others to investigate what I take to be the following important 
differences from CP and SP: First, that CP and SP differ in the “best interest” condition, 
of the condition that a promise must be in the best interest of the promisee in order for 
that promise to obtain, which in turn, produces the effect of threatening those who do not 
want the promise to come about. Secondly, that CP serve to reinforce world views in a 
way that is non-trivially different from SP. To do this, I employ Wittgensteinian language 
game theory to bridge the gap between traditional Searlian speech act theory to more 
modern McGowan-style oppressive language models. Through this process I develop and 
defend this alternative way of understanding and evaluating CP and political speech.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The current landscape of political speech is ripe for deep philosophical analysis 
yet has not been thoroughly investigated through the lens of speech-act theory. In this 
space, I believe I can contribute something novel to the area, namely a notion of 
campaign promises that differs from standard promises that may give rise to a new way 
of interpreting this kind of speech.  
Over the course of this paper, I will argue that Campaign Promises (CP) are non-
trivially and philosophically distinct from the notion of Standard Promises (SP). While I 
believe that there are many philosophical distinctions to draw, including moral, political 
and logical, my focus will be in philosophy of language. I will engage the work of Searle, 
Austin and Wittgenstein among others to investigate what I take to be the following 
important differences from CP and SP: 
I. That CP and SP differ in the “best interest” condition, of the condition that a 
promise must be in the best interest of the promisee in order for that promise 
to obtain, which in turn, produces the effect of threatening those who do not 
want the promise to come about. 
II. That CP serve to reinforce world views in a way that is non-trivially different 
from SP. 
It should also be stated here that while I use Campaign Promises as a short-hand for 
political promises writ large, they can be uttered in a variety of political contexts, not just 
while in pursuit of political office. With these propositions in mind, I hope to suggest a 
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philosophically distinct unit of speech in language, which I see as a component of a more 
complete picture of political speech. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
ON PROMISING, OR A "COMPLICATED FORMULATION" 
To start, it is imperative to give some description of what promising is. This is 
important, as for my proposals to hold, I must show that CP is a modification or subset of 
SP under the speech-act view. Of course, there are many different conceptions of 
promises and promising. Austin notes that a promise is a way of binding oneself to 
others.1 Scanlon believes that promises are fundamentally moral things, and not 
necessarily social practices.2 Hobbes took particular interest in the timing of these 
performances, “or both parts may contract now, to perform hereafter: in which cases, he 
that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of 
Promise…”3 For the purposes of this discussion, I believe a suitable starting point is the 
one laid out by Searle in Speech Acts, which he refers to as “How to Promise: a 
Complicated Way”: 
1. Normal input and output conditions obtain. 
2. In speaking, the Speaker expresses a proposition P. 
3. In uttering P, the Speaker predicates a future act, A of the Speaker. 
4. The hearer would prefer that A is performed to its not being performed, and the 
Speaker believes that the hearer prefers A.  
                                                 
1 Austin, Other Minds 99 
2 Scanlon, What We Owe Each Other 295-299 
3 Hobbes, Leviathan 193 
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5. It is not obvious to either the Speaker or Hearer that A will be performed over the 
normal course of events. 
6. Speaker intends to do A. 
7. The Speaker intends to obligate herself to A in uttering P. 
8. The Speaker intends to produce the understanding in the Hearer that the Speaker 
is now obligated to perform A. The Speaker intends to do this through the use of a 
particular utterance, of which the Hearer knows to have this effect. 
9. The rules of the dialect4 are such that the utterance is correctly and sincerely 
formulated IFF 1-8 obtain.5 
With this framework in mind, we can begin to eliminate many of the ordinary 
utterances that use promising language but aren’t really promises, such as “I promise the 
sun will come up tomorrow” when spoken to a child (fails 3, 5-9) or “I promise I’m only 
going to work” when a spouse is trying to cover up a clandestine affair (fails 6 and 7). 
We can understand a broken promise, or one that meets all these conditions, but fails to 
come to fruition due to some defect in the agent’s action.6  Promises that can misfire are 
ones where we promise to do our best, or to drive safely, or to be open to a proposition, 
where the outcome is ultimately negative.  
 In addition to these kinds of deficient promises, we should also understand how 
Searle accounts for “insincere” promises within this method. Searle recognizes that 
                                                 
4 In his original phrasing of these clauses, Searle uses the term “dialect” which I have reproduced here. This 
is likely dated, however, and had we been creating these clauses today in the modern corpus of philosophy 
of language, we might use the term “natural language” 
5 Paraphrase from Searle, Speech Acts, 59-61 
6 Moral theorists may have different conditions for broken promises, i.e. some may allow for promises to 
be superseded by other moral obligations. For my purposes, the moral theory isn’t relevant, so long as there 
are such things as broken promises. 
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sometimes the force of promises is manipulated in order to deceive or to get someone to 
do something they otherwise wouldn’t, and to preclude these kinds of promises (which 
clause 6 would appear to do) would leave his account lacking. As such, he proposes an 
amended version of (6): 
 6A. S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to 
do A. 
The difference between this formulation and the original may seem subtle, but it allows 
for more explanatory power than its predecessor. Imagine for a moment that I make an 
utterance such as, “I promise to pay you back for lunch next time we meet.” In this case 
however, I may have some additional background knowledge that I fail to share with you, 
such as the fact I am moving away and plan never to see you again. Under (6), what I 
have done in this case is not to promise, but to do something else. With (6A), we can 
recognize both the fact that I have promised, or at least produced in you the 
understanding that I have made a promise, and capture what I am really after in 
withholding information from you about my upcoming move, namely that I plan to skirt 
my responsibility to keep my promise, not that I don’t plan to carry out this repayment 
because what I did wasn’t really promising anyway. 
In addition to Searle’s “complicated” description of promising, he also provides some 
rules for the use of “illocutionary force indicating devices” with regards to promising. 
Since this paper is largely about the effects that politicians produce in those they wish to 
persuade or endear to their cause, it will be useful to produce and discuss those rules 
here: 
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 Rule 1. Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of 
discourse) T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A of the speaker S.  
 Rule 2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer H would prefer S’s doing A to his not 
doing A, and S believes H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A. 
 Rule 3. Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A 
in the normal course of events. 
 Rule 4. Pr is to be uttered only if S intends to do A.  
 Rule 5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A.7 
We can think of these rules as simply what it means to produce an effect in another 
by way of a speech-act, tailored to fit the format of promising. For Rule 1, our promise 
must have some “propositional content”, namely a future act. Promises about the sun 
rising the next day, the road getting easier up ahead, or a pain lessening are not promises 
but something else, perhaps vacillating on the spectrum between statements, 
reassurances, and expressions of hope. We might protest that “you promised it would get 
better!” when the pain gets worse, but we would be criticizing a statement of fact or 
knowledge, not claiming that you failed an obligation to uphold some end of a promise. 
Rule 2 represents what Searle calls the first of two “preparatory conditions”, namely 
conditions that should an utterance fail, they simply aren’t promises. If a particular act, 
say cutting your finger off, would simply never be something that you would prefer to not 
having your finger cut off, there is no way I can formulate my utterance in such a way as 
to convince you that it is something I am promising. I may be making some sort of threat 
or other guarantee, but I can’t twist my language in order to produce in you the effect of a 
                                                 
7 Searle, Speech Acts 63 
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promise. Our knowledge or beliefs may be updated in a similar way to a promise, but the 
fact remains, you must prefer an action to its non-commission, and I must believe that 
you have that preference.8 
Rule 3 is the second of the so-called “preparatory conditions”, and like Rule 2, shows 
us forcefully what a promise is not. A promise to wake up in the morning (if I regularly 
do so) is no promise at all if I am lacking any serious illness that would prevent me from 
doing so or have made other sleeping arrangements (interestingly, however, we can 
imagine many scenarios where even this rather simple statement is a promise under Rule 
3); but a promise to clean the yard when I have been notoriously resistant to doing is a 
promise, due in part to the fact that my cleaning of the yard is not usually to be counted 
on. 
Rule 4 represents the “sincerity condition” discussed earlier, and Searle notes it as 
such. What is interesting to note about the sincerity condition in Searle’s extension of the 
analysis is his claim that in promising, “I imply that the thing promised is in the hearer’s 
interest”9 because my utterance also implies my acceptance of the preparatory conditions. 
This is important to CP as I will demonstrate later, since when a politician makes a 
promise, they often validate a particular world view or value system as well. 
                                                 
8 Rule 2 represents a problematic area when promising to a group and is part of the tension between CP and 
SP that will be discussed at length. 
9 This way of phrasing by Searle may seem to be inaccurate, as the original formulation states that the 
hearer would merely prefer one action over another, as in my meeting you for lunch to my not meeting you 
for lunch. What Searle seems to imply here is that my acceptance of the preparatory conditions is only to 
imply that an action is in your best interest. This could lead to cases where I “promise” you something you 
don’t prefer, like an unnecessary vaccination. I don’t think Searle’s goal at this juncture is to dissect 
preference and the notion of “best interest”, so I will be treating his language as a stand-in for “hearer 
prefers the performance of A to its not being performed”. 
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  Rule 5, however, is more interesting and represents what Searle considers to be 
the “essential rule”. Rule 5 reminds us that in making this kind of utterance, one that 
meets these conditions, counts as the obligation forming device. There need not be any 
other action taken to cement a promise, the effect is produced in the hearer and that is 
that. This contrasts with other ritualistic speech-act ceremonies, such as the christening of 
a ship. It is not enough to merely utter the words, “I christen this vessel the USS John 
McCain”, one must also crack a bottle of champagne across the bow, if that is the correct 
series of actions in a given society. Promising is like thanking, on the Searlian account, 
where merely correctly performing an utterance of thanking counts as an expression of 
gratitude, a gift or handwritten card would be additional expressions of gratitude. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
WHAT IS POLITICAL SPEECH? 
With a structured view of promising in mind, it is now important to understand the 
contextual differences that may arise between SP and CP. One of my underlying 
assumptions about CP is that for a Campaign Promise to be such, it must be uttered as a 
unit of political speech. Context is important to the uttering of a promise, and for CP, 
there is a requirement of that context being within the confines of political speech. 
Political speech is uttered in a certain context or about a certain context, and to draw out 
the unique properties I will follow the approach of Austin’s dialectical method. As such, 
here are some examples of contexts: 
A. “I promise to fix the roads” – uttered at a rally by a political candidate. 
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B. “I promise to fix the roads” – uttered by an elected representative to a constituent 
over the phone 
C. “If we win in November, the roads will be fixed” – uttered by a pundit on a TV 
show. 
D. “When we mobilize, we can get the right politicians to get in there and fix the 
roads” – uttered by an activist at a demonstration 
E. “I think Politician X will fix the roads” – uttered by a college student to a friend. 
A through D certainly look like political speech, with B being unique in that it is not 
speech uttered to a group. All these speech acts are either in a certain context, i.e. a 
political rally, a demonstration, or by an individual who has the implicit endorsement of 
the party. 
 E, however, is not political speech at all, despite being about politics and politicians. 
This is useful for us and represents a guidepost by which we might evaluate other 
utterances. But why isn’t it political speech? 
1. It is a speech act uttered in private. 
2. It is a speech act uttered by a non-political actor (or so we will assume in this 
case, it is very often that college students are engaged in activism, but in this case, we are 
envisioning the average bewildered freshman). A non-political actor may be one who has 
no intent to affect any views, nor works for any political campaign or activist group. 
They may be your average well-informed citizen who votes. In this case, however, they 
are merely expressing a statement of fact or belief, not engaging in political speech. 
3. There seems to be something about the fact that the speech act doesn’t engage one 
politically. 
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It would seem that anyone can engage in political speech given the right context. For 
example, we could imagine our bewildered freshman from the previous example 
attending a demonstration and being so moved by the speakers that she takes the stage 
herself and expresses her experiences to an audience. Obviously, there is some level of 
endorsement in this case. It is important to make a distinction between someone running 
up on stage and shouting racist slogans and someone being invited up on stage to speak 
about their time as a Mexican immigrant. These two factors form the important pillars of 
who can engage in political speech: 
a) Anyone can engage in political speech given the right context and  
b) They must be given legitimacy by a political party or group 
This “legitimacy” can arise in many ways. It can be as simple as being invited on 
stage, it can be that an individual is elected as a representative of the party or nominated 
as a candidate, it can be that an individual is a recognized donor to the party and so on. 
Through these processes and others, individuals can “speak” for the party. Importantly, 
political groups or parties function as collectives, and those collectives have agency in 
who they endorse. Similarly, the National Football League selects specific individuals to 
referee the game of American Football and does not recognize the jeering of fans of 
certain calls. Those fans who shout “Pass Interference” may be performing a similar 
utterance to the referees on the field, but since it is not endorsed by the NFL, it has a very 
different function. 
As we will see in further discussions, this understanding forms the basis of my second 
proposition, that CP’s serve to reinforce worldviews. All these examples of political 
speech serve to lay planks in a party’s platform, and if not lay new planks, reinforce old 
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ones. Throughout this work I will continue to reference these “platforms”, despite that a 
party’s published platform may differ from its implicit or informal platform. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
LANGUAGE GAMES AND CAMPAIGN PROMISES 
What of Political or Campaign promises then? CP often do not take the form of 
standard promises in the vein of “I promise that…” Instead, they often employ language 
that insinuates commitment without deploying the more typical language of promising, 
“Read my lips: No New Taxes”.10 Still, they are attributed the moniker “promises” and 
are often held up as similar failures of obligation. Bush Senior certainly knows this well, 
after he signed new taxes into law, as his own words likely caused the end of his 
presidency. I believe that since these promises function differently than SP, we should 
analyze them as this alternative promising-type speech act. 
In trying to understand the differences between SP and CP, as well as to argue for the 
propositions I laid forth at the outset, it will be useful to follow Searle’s rules to get a 
better picture of where these kinds of promises fall within the model. For (1), we must 
know that the Speaker and Hearer can understand each other. In Searle’s discussion of 
this clause, he notes that “…they are not acting in a play or telling jokes, etc.” A modern-
day example of this kind of promising play-acting might come in the form of Sasha 
Baron Cohen-style guerrilla comedy. In his show, “Who is America?”, he plays a mirror 
to what most would consider the far-right in America. He acts sincere about things like 
endorsing the use of firearms by toddlers and convinces his interlocutors that this is a 
                                                 
10 George HW Bush, 1988 Republican National Convention 
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useful pursuit as well. We might imagine that in the course of these discussions, he 
makes some assurances or guarantees that some information or statements will be kept 
confidential. Unlike a play or a movie (despite that the content is then used for 
entertainment) Cohen’s interlocutors have no idea that they are part of a pretend-promise 
and may well have the “effect” of a promise produced in them. Regardless, this is not a 
sincere promise on the Searlian formulation, as Cohen is merely using the people in his 
discussions as set pieces, and likely finds it beneficial to his pursuit of art and comedy to 
compel the most outlandish statements possible. Cohen is generally playing a consistent 
character, and we might imagine that those featured in the show do believe (or have the 
effect of belief produced in them, to put it in speech-act terms) that the promise is 
genuine. Certainly, this is an example of something that Searle would consider to be an 
insincere promise.11   
As a component of CP, politicians often “put on a show” (meaning that politicians 
must often give more full-throated support to certain issues than they would otherwise, or 
endorse certain positions that they disagree with in order to retain power) to garner the 
support of their constituency.12 This, functionally, is different from what we ordinarily 
have in mind when we think about promising. When I promise to pick up your children 
from soccer practice, I’m not employing terms that have special meaning, and so you take 
me at my word—I have obligated myself to pick up your children from soccer practice 
                                                 
11 Thanks to Dr. Steven Reynolds for suggesting this remark. This case is unique in that unlike watching a 
Shakespearian play and seeing one actor make a promise to another, the line between play-acting and 
reality is somewhat blurred. 
12 Can a relevant distinction be made between politicians who “really” believe a particular world view and 
those that are merely “play-acting” to win a political seat? Surely this happens with some frequency, 
namely that individuals lobby and vote for things that they do not believe in fully themselves on behalf of 
their constituents, or less scrupulously, to get re-elected. This may prove to be an additional divergence of 
CP from standard promising.  
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and should I fail to do so (barring any countervailing reasons), I will be morally 
blameworthy. A politician, who makes a promise along the lines of, “I promise to fix the 
roads”, again, is not using any specialized meanings and we would think them obligated 
to follow through on this promise should they wish to avoid being found blameworthy. 
However, I do not think that politicians generally employ explicit promising language, 
and I also believe that the language they do use is coded to match the language of their 
supporters (i.e., employing terms like “Pro-Life”, “Illegal Immigrants”, and “SJWs”). In 
fact, much of what is later held up as “campaign promises” employ no promising 
signaling device and may instead employ some form of transactional language along the 
lines of “A vote for me is a vote for a brighter future for our children as I will introduce 
new environmental legislation”. 
While this kind of role-playing may be wholly different than what Searle is 
mentioning in clause (1), one must consider that when a sociopolitical environment 
becomes particularly polarized, ideological stances are so rigidly defined that deviance 
from the core is often a recipe for political failure. As I hope to show throughout these 
pages, tokens of political speech are employed in order to whip up support within a party 
for a particular candidate, and often these tokens are deployed in the context of a 
campaign promise. When these promises fail or misfire or otherwise do not come to 
fruition, then, not only do they have the effect of letting down the “base”, they have the 
additional effect of inciting retaliation. This was the case for Bush Senior. It may have 
been his deeply held belief that new taxes were bad for the country and based on this 
belief he would not allow any to be enacted on his watch. When evidence was presented 
to him that caused him to update his belief (i.e. that new taxes were in fact beneficial for 
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the country), he was likely faced with a choice—uphold his promise and ignore this new 
information or do the best thing for everyone and break it at the cost of his second term.13 
One might wonder, however, how these groups become so polarized and so non-
responsive to persuasive arguments from opposing viewpoints. While there are likely 
swaths of empirical data on the subject, the answer is thus explained from a philosophical 
perspective by Wittgenstenian language games more than anything. We know that there 
are many kinds of games in life, board games, ball games, card games, games played 
with teams, games played alone, games played outside, and games played on a computer 
and so on. One salient commonality among all these games, is that in order to play them, 
you need to know that you are playing the game in question. As many others have noted, 
Searle among them, to simply move the chess pieces on the board is not to be playing 
chess. Put another way, we might argue that “Anyone playing chess knows they are 
playing chess, and not something else”. We could create a maxim for all these kinds of 
games along the same line. The problem with language and other meta-games is that we 
often do not hold conscious the fact that we are playing some type of game, and in doing 
so, are not playing some other type of game. How can this be? Take for a moment a 
discussion between two wrestlers, and one mentions to another that they prefer a certain 
style over another because of its use of grapples. Certainly, this wrestler could have used 
more imprecise language that was not as meaningful in the language game of wrestling, 
namely “moves relating to me using my body to prevent the motion of the limbs or body 
                                                 
13 “Read My Lips: No New Taxes” sounds like a promise that lacks any specialized language, and it is, of 
course, an implicit promise. As I will discuss in later sections, even words that may have plain meanings in 
other contexts, as in when you might ask how much sales tax there is on an item, in these political contexts, 
they may have wholly different values or effects to different political groups. One group might associate 
taxes with better access to services, more safety, while another side may feel just the opposite. 
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of my competitor”, but since this wrestler is talking to another, she feels confident in 
deploying this language-game token in this way. She also does not mean to employ this 
token in a way that it is used in other games, when she utters “grapple” she does not 
mean grape-apple hybrids or a specialized attack in Dungeons and Dragons. In this way, 
she has deliberately selected a language game token for use in the conversation with 
another peer but has not consciously recognized the fact that she is engaging in some 
specialized conversation. This failure to hold conscious is a common effect and is put 
most on display when we “accidentally” deploy these terms to individuals who are not 
participants in the language game we are referencing. Recently, for instance, I reported to 
a school’s administration office to meet with a TVI. When I made this utterance to the 
administration employee, they responded confused and did not know what I was referring 
to. It was then that I realized I was employing a specialized short-hand that would only be 
understood by those in the special education field. What I really was requesting was a 
meeting with the school’s Teacher of the Visually Impaired. Wittgenstein himself saw the 
apparent friction in translation this way:  
531. We speak of understanding in a sentence in the sense in which it can 
be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense that it 
cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than a musical theme can be 
replaced by another). In the one case, the thought in the sentence is what is 
common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed 
only by these words in these positions. (Understanding in a poem.)14 
                                                 
14 Wittgenstein, Philosophilcal Investigations 152 
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 Here Wittgenstein speaks to the effect thus far described, we can approximate 
translations of phrases like TVI and Grapples as I used above, otherwise I would have 
been unable to provide the reader with a general picture of what they meant. However, as 
Wittgenstein points out, to those that can recognize those items in their natural places, 
there is an additional level or modality of understanding conveyed to the listener. 
This effect is pronounced even more so in the case of politics. While modern-day 
specific examples such as “Pro-Life” and “Pro-Choice” will be discussed later, it is 
interesting to look back on examples that seem straightforward and undisputed. For 
example, I believe that in the United States people refer to any party that is not Democrat 
or Republican as “third-party”, and I take it that they would mean any party that is not 
truly competitive in the way that the two major parties are. To wit, Merriam Webster 
refers to “third-party” in a similar way: “a major political party operating over a limited 
period of time in addition to two other major parties in a nation or state normally 
characterized by a two-party system.”15 However, the Pocket Dictionary of American 
Slang, originally published in 1960, has a different interpretation of what a third-party is 
“[a]ny new, completely American, completely political party other than the Republican 
or Democratic party.”16 The work goes on to describe examples of third parties in this 
way: 
From time to time such parties are formed, usu[ally] by dissatisfied factions of one of 
the two major parties. Generally speaking, the Socialist Party is not new enough nor 
                                                 
15 Merriam Webster, Third Party 
16 Harold Wentworth and Stuart Berg Flexner, The Pocket Dictionary of American Slang 
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the Communist Party sufficiently American to be called third parties; such as the 
Vegetarian Party are not completely political…17  
As we can see, the usage of these terms has evolved, and we can imagine that by 
employing the term third party in a way that denies certain groups political legitimacy, 
one is engaging in a specialized usage of terms that not all will recognize. 
 Now that we understand this lack of holding conscious, I believe that language 
games are the best way to understand how these tight-knit language communities are 
formed and why they are resistant to change (namely, I am reluctant to change my beliefs 
about a particular topic because the language I employ reinforces my belief in a certain 
position, and since I lack this objective perspective about the language I am using by 
being a member of a language, it is extremely difficult for me to get out of the linguistic 
trap I am in). Language games, since they are by their nature collective activities where 
groups of people work often unconsciously to attach meaning or significance to words in 
ways that might vary from others, are a useful explanatory tool to show how political 
groups can be engendered and how CP can have different effects than SP. To expand on 
this point, it will be useful to reference an example: 
The UFO Believer 
Jane is your average educated individual who landed a job as a social media 
coordinator. Spending most of her time online, she learned to be skeptical of things she 
saw online, and she held a standard set of beliefs about the universe, planets, science and 
so on, but had not had to spend much time learning or researching those things on her 
own. On her way home one evening, she saw a low, bright flash of light that she had 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
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never in her life seen before, and she could not explain it using her current knowledge. 
She raced online to find a community of people who had similar experiences, describing 
them with vivid detail. Again, she was skeptical, but the more she researched and talked 
to people in the community, she began to gain comfort with the idea. What she had seen 
was a UFO. As part of joining this community, she gained access to a variety of terms 
unique to the community of UFO. She knew what crop circles were and how to interpret 
them. She could discern between “cigar-shaped” and “sphere-shaped”. Her access to 
these special terms allowed her to retreat to them when faced with contrary evidence. Her 
interlocutors simply weren’t speaking the same language she was. 
An example of this kind of “special access” to language enabling Jane to 
disregard evidence to the contrary might be a scenario in which a local news report shows 
images of what appears to be long flashes of light in the night sky. They might even enlist 
the help of an astronomical expert to tell a story of how various effects in the Earth’s 
atmosphere contribute to brief flashes of light in the sky. Jane, at this point, however, has 
already disregarded the argument. The images to her are not “long flashes of light”, but 
“cigar-shaped unidentified objects” and for someone to fail to recognize this other story 
means that Jane need not consider the alternative view. 
While not everyone is susceptible to beliefs about UFOs in this manner, we can 
see how our ordinary social groups help to form our understandings of certain issues. 
Academia represents an extreme example of this self-sorting, as philosophers can often 
engage in discussions where they are talking past each other. As Goodman notes in A 
Critical Discussion of Talking Past One Another, “philosophers talk past one another 
when each has a different meaning or concept in mind for a term that is crucial to their 
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discussion.”18 This kind of effect is evident in the geographical self-sorting of 21st 
century American politics. Data-driven publication 538 noted that this effect intensified 
in 2016 and lamented that  “[i]n an increasing number of communities like Baldwin 
County, Alabama, which gave Trump 80 percent of its major-party votes, and San Mateo, 
California, which gave Clinton 80 percent, an entire generation of youth will grow up 
without much exposure to alternative political points of view.”19 Again, this separation 
does not rob individuals of a common language, but it does lend credence to the idea that 
different tokens of political speech will produce radically different perlocutionary effects 
in different places even if definitions are held fixed. 
Returning to our discussion of (1) for CP, we must understand that this kind of 
extreme self-sorting occurs in politically polarized societies, so that while a politician 
may utter a CP in a language common to all, it may contain terms unique to one political 
persuasion. While politician X may not believe that “Pro-Life” is the right phrase to 
capture their view on abortion (more on this in a moment), they might need to employ the 
term (i.e. “I promise to continue to fight for the pro-life community”) in order to garner 
the appropriate support. As a result, if someone is not familiar with the term or its usage 
in the pro-life game, they, under (1), cannot be said to be the receivers of the promise. In 
this way, intended or not, under the Searlian approach, promises are made only to the 
“base”, or those that agree with the views of the politician and engage in the same use of 
language.  
                                                 
18 Jeffrey Goodman, A Critical Discussion of Talking Past One Another 
19 David Wasserman, Purple America has all but Disappeared 
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This feels like an unintuitive result, however. Surely an individual who makes a 
CP is promising something not just to supporters, they are promising to the public at large 
(the voting public, perhaps). But as we will see in continuing down this path of Searle’s 
structure, CP’s may be something other than promises in the eyes of non-supporters. 
They may be mere statements of position, if someone is neutral about an issue, or they 
may be threats, if someone feels that the content of the promise would be harmful to their 
way of life. 
What would it mean for a politician to use a term identified from a party 
language-game, such as Pro-Life, in the course of a campaign promise, and how could 
that term not accurately capture one’s position? I believe that these tokens of political 
language games often come loaded with very strict definitions and are highly resistant to 
modification. Consider another game such as chess. When a player refers to a piece as a 
pawn or a knight, those terms have strict definitions that defy aberration. We know that 
regardless of if the knight is white or black, or shaped like a boat or a sheep in some 
novelty set, that it moves in an L shaped pattern. Regardless, when I employ the token 
“knight” in the context of a chess conversation, the illocutionary effect may be an object 
that is either black or white, and likely shaped like a horse. You may understand what I 
am referring to, but what I am holding conscious when I deploy the term is an M-1 
Abrams piece that was part of my family’s chess set. We are discussing the same token, 
which obeys the same rules, but it may appear different in each of our mental images. 
Likewise, politicians who generally are more engaged in policy than their 
constituents, likely have nuanced views of the various positions they hold. One might 
think that abortion rights are important, and that everyone should have equal and 
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confidential access to it, but they might feel squeamish about supporting that right 
beyond a certain point in pregnancy. Conversely, one might think that abortion is 
fundamentally morally wrong, but believe that certain things constitute morally 
overriding reasons such that abortions in the case of rapes or in cases where the mother is 
at mortal risk are morally acceptable as well. Unfortunately, crafting these nuanced 
positions are often not associated with electoral success, so politicians rely on the short-
hand of “Pro-Life” and “Pro-Choice”, which represent the dogmatic absolutes of these 
positions. As such, one may interpret a promise made for one position or another to be 
either salvation or life-threatening, but often it is nowhere in between. 
A lengthy discussion of (2), or “In speaking, the Speaker expresses a proposition 
P”, in the framework of CP is not necessary, but it is a useful point to reiterate for the 
purposes of evaluation. If we are to engage in serious discussion of a particular CP, it 
must be something that can be evaluated. “I promise to help get our veterans the 
healthcare they need” and “Read my lips: no new taxes” may both be examples of 
propositions that P, but “Make America Great Again”20 may not be. The latter kind of 
utterances may be some type of performative utterances, but we cannot be sure that they 
fit into the category of promises. 
Clause (3) reads as follows: 
 3. In uttering P, the Speaker predicates a future act, A of the Speaker. 
                                                 
20 Throughout this paper I have left the scope of CP fairly open, since as previously discussed, rarely do 
politicians employ specific promising markers. Here may mark some delineation, as I worry that CP must 
at a minimum point to some relatively specific content. Typical promises and platforms involve “keeping 
government small” “ensuring safety nets for the disadvantaged” and “providing equal opportunities in 
education”. “Make America Great Again” seems to lack any specific content (unless one could argue that 
under the framework I have provided, it is a dog whistle of some sort and does point to some specific 
content). 
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This is where Searle’s analysis diverges slightly from CP. The clause is clear, in 
making a promise, we are predicating a future act that we will perform. This again limits 
the scope of what we can promise, i.e. we cannot promise that the sun will rise tomorrow 
or that the road up ahead gets easier, as these are not things that are future acts we can 
perform (or that we can have an affect over in normal circumstances). 
The reason that this is important with regards to CP is that politicians often make, and 
form “promises” involving propositions that do not rely only on their actions. As to the 
first part, we may not see any space for them and feel it unnecessary to afford them any 
escape from their predicative abilities, but I do feel it necessary to note that often people 
are elected before having the experience of policymaking. However, CP must create 
space for this more limited involvement in action, since despite making broad claims (“A 
vote for me is a vote to build a land bridge between Alaska and Russia”), they are often 
viewed as promises. Consider then a 3* for CP: 
3*.  In uttering P, the Speaker predicates a future state of affairs, A, which the 
Speaker will attempt to bring about. 
This formulation is important, because political societies may have many different 
organizational structures and methods of enacting policy. Unlike standard promises, a 
politician may have to take on a variety of actions, or no actions at all, to bring about a 
policy. There may be actions they need to take on that they could not have predicted in 
order to realize a certain state of affairs, such as the signing of a new treaty between the 
US and Russia in order to build said land bridge. As such, trying to predict a “state of 
affairs” instead of a “future act” seems to be a more apt description of what a politician is 
doing when they promise. 
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 The word “attempt” here may seem to be another problematic insertion into the 
formulation as well, but I think it to be important. More so even than in standard 
promises, there seems to be a spectrum along which a promise is said to be fulfilled by a 
politician, and largely that is due to the public perception of a politician’s “attempt” to 
bring about what they claimed they would. Naturally, this perception is sometimes fickle, 
but generally, politicians are rewarded by their supporters when they do what they can to 
carry out promised policy ideas even when they fail.  
Clause (4) reads as follows: 
4. The hearer would prefer that A is performed to its not being performed, and the 
Speaker believes that the hearer prefers A. 
This clause may illuminate the most significant divergence of Searle’s Formulation 
from CP, at least in understanding. While it is evident that a promise must in general be 
something a promisee prefers to be a promise (otherwise it is a threat or something else), 
there may be some friction between what an agent desires and what would really benefit 
them. For example, US politics is rife with examples where what appears to be the 
immediately rational choice for a certain voting bloc is not the one that is selected, i.e. 
those in poor or impoverished locations voting for taxes or benefits that they might never 
realize. In these cases, we can often point to a value system derived from party and 
cultural membership that may give agents some reason to prefer things that may not 
practically benefit them. A prime example may be a group or party that supports “small 
government” at the cost of services that might benefit them, such as financial safety nets 
or even well-maintained roads. 
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 However, if we allow this value-system question to be too broad, we may end up in 
situations where not only is an agent’s (or voter’s) preference not good for them, but 
good for no one. In the case of standard promises, this line is firmer around the domain of 
rationality, if I promise you that I am going to burn the building we are in down with both 
of us in it, not only would this normally be considered a threat, but if you were to prefer 
it, we might think that you have faulty preferences. In the case of CP, however, there may 
be policies that seem equivalent to burning the building down, (I promise to return coal 
fired factories to industrial-revolution era levels), but they may be justified by some 
combination of values or political theory and the distance from the promise to the result. I 
believe that this is an interesting question to explore further, namely the difference 
between irrational preferences when an agent is thinking about personal consequences 
and irrational preferences when an agent is considering political theories, but I leave that 
for another space. 
Clause (5) of Searle’s Formulation is as follows: 
5. It is not obvious to either the Speaker or Hearer that A will be performed over 
the normal course of events. 
This clause also provides an interesting juncture for CP, since in general, we assume 
party members to have a certain level of buy-in to a party platform and are therefore 
likely to support and enact many of those tenets should they be elected.   
If, then, a CP is not performed in order to guarantee something new to the base (i.e. 
fulfill clause 5), what does it do? I believe that these kinds of performances are designed 
to reinforce the view that what is promised as something rightful to desire. Put another 
way, a CP is uttered to assure the base that a particular policy position (no new taxes, a 
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wall, carbon credits, etc.) are things worth having provided by (or in some cases, 
prohibited by or prevented by) a government, and that they are worth incorporating into 
one’s conception of what ought to be a standard of government practice. An example of 
this might be that when a politician promises something like an end to nuclear 
proliferation, and the party and its constituents sign on or endorse that promise, 
supporters of that politician may now feel that the end of nuclear proliferation is 
something to advocate for even if that politician loses. Those supporters may require 
from future candidates in that party that they support a similar process. In the real world, 
this type of preference shifting came quickly in the modern-day United States, where a 
candidate, Bernie Sanders, argued for single-payer healthcare.21 This was an argument 
previously thought to be unwinnable in the United States, but despite Sanders’ loss, the 
party has shifted its weight towards advocating for a single-payer style system, largely 
due to the preferences of its constituents.22 23 Since the constituents were moved by this 
ideal, the party had to shift its informal platform to better accommodate it as part of the 
party’s vision for the future. Again, this may contribute to that irrational preference 
setting mentioned earlier, but it is worth noting where the effect starts. 
Clause (6) reads: 
6. The Speaker intends to do A 
Intention is a difficult thing to pin down, especially in complex situations like running 
for office or running a government, so (6) may not be as revealing as some of the other 
clauses. Specifically, it states that the Speaker must intend to do A. Presidents have lots of 
                                                 
21 Scott Horsely, Bernie Sanders Revives Debate Over Single-Payer Health Care 
22 Peter Sullivan, Democrats March toward single-payer healthcare 
23 Ryan Struyk and Gregory Krieg, Majority of Democratic voters are all-in on single-payer 
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authority over preventing new measures, i.e. they can veto new tax legislation making it 
very difficult for it to come to fruition, but other cases are much more difficult to parse 
out. If the Pope provides some guarantee that there will be no more cases of abuse in the 
church, is that really something he can do? Perhaps he can prevent any information from 
leaving the church, or he can bar children from entering churches, or he can 
excommunicate all current priests and bring in new ones, but that surely isn’t what he 
means and isn’t what the hearer is expecting. 
Generally, I think that by running under a certain flag or party, politicians and 
bureaucrats intend to commit themselves to certain positions in order to gain themselves 
a consistent base of voters or supporters. Those who often dismiss party dogma, 
especially in a highly polarized political environment often fail to capture the support of 
the opposite party enough to offset the losses that they take in their own. As such, I think 
clause (7), or that the Speaker intends to obligate herself to A in uttering P, remains intact 
when it comes to CP. However, it may be argued that many CP fail to obligate the 
speaker to anything, given their high level of vagueness. In this case, an utterance does 
not fail to be a CP, as its perlocutionary effects are still produced. 
For (8), it is clear that the speaker or politician surely intends their hearers to 
understand that they are committing themselves to some set of actions that will promote 
the realization of a specific goal,24 but they are also interested in producing other 
perlocutionary effects, such as support, excitement, patriotic sentiments, hope and so on. 
The campaign promise is also a team-building exercise; it serves to engender a world 
view, typically against another, competing world view. 
                                                 
24 Thanks to Dr. de Marneffe for this phrasing 
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 Clause (9) is interesting for our discussion of political promises. (9), which reads 
“the rules of the dialect are such that the utterance is correctly and sincerely formulated 
IFF 1-8 obtain”, represents a requirement not only for individuals to be speaking the 
same language (i.e. it would be no use to for me to promise you something in French if 
you only spoke German), but that those individuals are also speaking the same “dialect”. 
For the purposes of this discussion, and I believe it to be the intent of Searle, I think we 
may read dialect here as “using the same colloquial natural language”, or as Searle goes 
on to elaborate, “[t]he meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by the meaning of its 
elements, both lexical and syntactical”.25 He goes on to note that clause (1) (in his words, 
“Normal input and output conditions obtain”) can be seen as sufficient to cover the 
assumption that the speaker and hearer understand each other, but clause (8) and (9) help 
to get us over the hump if we think Searle is “asking too much” of his input and output 
conditions.26 
 
CHAPTER 5 
LANGUAGE GAMES: WHY NOT TRANSLATION? 
In earlier examples, I used the concept of language games to show that some terms 
are tokens of political groups and that other groups would simply not “get” the full 
meaning of those terms. I likened this to someone who gets sucked into a group that 
believes in UFO’s as existent (perhaps a mirage of expertise), and I insinuated that their 
                                                 
25 Searle, Speech Acts, 61 
26 Ibid. 
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access to special in-group terms enabled them to be even more resistant to persuasion 
than they otherwise would be. 
One response to this may be that I am missing a possibility—namely, translation. 
When someone employs a term like “Pro-Life” or “Undocumented Immigrant”, are they 
really employing a term so resistant to description to the outgroup that they simply will 
not understand no matter what lengths one goes to in order to explain the term? To 
reiterate my position, yes, these tokens are specific units of a language game engaged in 
by specialized political groups.  
I believe this is because political groups appropriate these terms for their own uses, 
and through their speech, insert them into their repertoire of performative acts and make 
them unique. As in the UFO example above, we may be able to discern what “cigar-
shaped” might mean, via English language cues. We can probably assume that what is 
being described is some sort of elongated “UFO”, but without giving some buy-in to the 
UFO language game, the appropriate image may never be fully formed in our minds, or 
as Austin might say, the perlocutionary effect is not appropriately produced. 
My argument then is to extend this contextualizing to language groups, whether it be 
plumbers, UFO enthusiasts, or Republicans, and to note that while the terms they employ 
may look normal and accessible to those outside of the group, they are “technical terms” 
or “terms of art” in some sense and require group participation to fully understand. To 
understand fully what “Deep Groove” might mean for record collectors, you would have 
to engage in some record collecting yourself, not simply to know the definition, but to 
understand the value. We can attempt to translate the phrase, and we may get at things 
like “the grooves are deeper” or “a certain record label” or “a particular quality”, and 
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while we may be close, we would miss the definition of a singular “deep” groove on the 
label, and the association with that groove being an earlier, higher quality pressing of a 
record. To get the value of this phrase, we may need to hear several versions of the same 
recording to realize that this is indeed the most desirable version of this recording. 
Further, one might need to be a specialized record collector, not only someone in 
possession of many records but with knowledge of the ways in which music is recorded. 
“Deep Groove” functions much like jargon, however, since it is unclear that it is a 
common term among many other professions or “in-groups” (perhaps, downhill skiers). 
What makes political speech tokens particularly context dependent is that political groups 
may have associations and uses for terms that are divergent and irreconcilable. 
Take “Pro-life” for example—the definition between groups is largely the same, 
namely the forgoing of any abortions with the intent to protect the lives of all the unborn 
(surely there are edge cases, but this seems to be a useful standard). While both the left 
and the right in the US and perhaps elsewhere may assent to this description of the term, 
they may value (or again, in Austinian terms, have the effect produced in them) the term 
wildly differently. The right may see Pro-Life as a term that represents morality, hope, 
and even perhaps religious reverence. The left may see the term as representative as 
patriarchal, murderous, and immoral. These effects are immediate and unconscious, and 
they make translation impossible. 
This would seem to conflict with Searle’s position in a few ways. After all, he 
imagines a chess game taking place in two different countries with different conventions, 
i.e. the rook being the tallest piece instead of the king, and the squares being numbered 
instead of black and white, and that these chess games could be translated from one 
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country to another since the underlying game of chess remains unchanged.  Further, in 
reference to languages, “[d]ifferent human languages, to the extent that they are inter-
translatable, can be regarded as different conventional realizations of the same underlying 
rules.”  This is important, for without this, as Searle notes, we would not be able to 
describe promises without reference to a language. Put more clearly, we would not be 
satisfied with a theory of illocutionary effects or even promises that says “I promise…” 
creates an obligation whereas “Je promets…” does not. Importantly, Searle emphasizes 
that this works only when languages are inter-translatable, most languages might have a 
word for “I” or a reference to oneself, but some languages may not have a word for “e-
mail”, or mail sent over the internet. Similarly, simply because we can translate 
apercevoir as “to see”, the sense may be quite different depending on the context, one 
that a non-native speaker will simply not realize. 
I believe that this shows that not only do these special terms of art appear in every 
day parlance, I think that they have unique values or senses for in-group speakers and that 
this formulation is compatible with the rigorous speech act conditions that Searle lays 
out. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REVIEW 
Thus far, I have argued that CP are fundamentally different from a philosophically 
robust form of SP in Searle’s method, and that language games help explain the rise of 
this in-group resistance to the definition of terms. Throughout this work, I have 
mentioned the various touchstones of my initial arguments, but I will now return to those 
propositions to reinforce their foundations and recall their arguments.  
I. That CP and SP differ in the “best interest” condition, of the condition that a 
promise must be in the best interest of the promisee in order for that promise 
to obtain, which in turn, produces the effect of threatening those who do not 
want the promise to come about. 
This proposition is in direct response to Searle’s clause 4, which states that the hearer 
of the promise must prefer its completion to its non-completion. Again, this is an intuitive 
supposition by Searle, I cannot promise to hurt you or otherwise do something that you 
would not like, for that would be a threat. We might imagine that there would be some 
outliers in group situations, if I promise you, wearing a blue shirt, that I will only charge 
those wearing red shirts extra to enter the amusement park, I may have promised you 
something but in some way harmed hearers who are wearing red shirts. CP functions in 
just the opposite way, i.e. we can find very few examples where there are none threatened 
by a guarantee. I believe that this is for two reasons, one, that CP are often uttered to all 
or most of a constituency, and that constituency will likely be one in which some do not 
want whatever CP it is to come about. Even in the most uniting of circumstances, such as 
just after the attacks of 9/11 and America’s decision to go to war with Iraq, support for 
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the war was never unanimous.27 This forms the basis of the second reason, that CP that 
do not threaten may not be CP at all. They may not employ political speech, or they may 
not be a guarantee of anything. We might imagine a promise by a politician to step down 
after killing a pedestrian by driving drunk to reach unanimous support, but this kind of 
thing sounds more like a standard promise than anything else.  
As discussed earlier in this paper, political speech and the promises that go along with 
them form a body of collective knowledge and values. In some ways, politics functions 
like religion in that it gives its followers (or constituents) reasons to value and support 
things that would not otherwise be supported by a more self-centered egoism. In fact, in 
the case of politics, value systems may be constructed such that certain individual 
supporters may never reap the benefits of a particular policy. Returning to Rule 4 of 
Searle’s analysis, his “sincerity condition”, Searle mentions that in promising, in 
believing that someone desires something, we promise them that we will perform it 
because we also believe it is in their best interest. If I promised my child a bike, and they 
desperately wanted a bike but lacked any balance or body control, I may be promising 
something that they desire but I would be failing the sincerity condition because I have 
the foresight to see that they will likely cause themselves injury. This same sincerity 
condition must be absent from politics, since politicians will often make promises that 
line up with a base’s values but not their interest. This is a descriptive approach. Surely, 
we may think that it would be better if politicians only made promises that met Searle’s 
sincerity condition, but I think it would be insufficient to leave these kinds of promises 
                                                 
27 According to Gallup’s data, support for America’s war in Iraq was as high as 90%, but never complete.  
https://news.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx 
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out, since they do happen with regularity, and they are treated in the same fashion in 
political discourse. 
II. That CP serve to reinforce world views in a way that is non-trivially different 
from SP. 
Fundamentally, what politicians guarantee to citizens is what lays out the 
framework of the political conversation. When President Obama promised affordable 
healthcare for all, he contributed to the shift of his party’s renewed focus (and, by 
extension, it’s supporters) to making healthcare accessible and taking on the problem of 
coverage gaps by the government instead of the free market. In response, the opposition 
party rejected this notion, feeling that the quality of healthcare and eventually, its 
accessibility, would suffer in the long run. For Obama’s party, healthcare for all in one 
form or another became a symbol of a thriving and just nation, and for the opposition, it 
became a symbol of socialism and the stripping away of personal freedoms. The push and 
pull rages on today, but it is largely not about the data, policy line items or even 
outcomes. What the conversation about healthcare has become, much like other objects 
that have been given rise to by CP’s, is a symbol of what divides ideological viewpoints 
on the issue. 
Symbols are important conversational markers, just like in any other cultural or 
religious movement, and they become cheap, digestible focal points for citizens who do 
not have the time or bandwidth to consume every modicum of policy debate. We ought 
not expect them to, either, as the job of any representative government system is to 
enable persons to spend less time working to understand deeply nuanced policy issues. 
These symbols enable citizens to quickly answer problems in a conversational way, 
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which further sharpens their world view. Take for example a border wall with Mexico, a 
promise of President Trump’s, that has quickly become a symbol of what is necessary to 
address the immigration issue.. These conversational responses to problems come down 
quite readily to this: 
1. Illegal immigration is bad for several reasons: it violates the law, it 
encourages immigrants to engage in a dangerous journey, it creates a 2nd class 
of citizens, and so on. As such, a wall will discourage their arrival and answer 
these problems.  
2. A wall is bad for several reasons: we, like Europe, are dealing with our own 
migrant crisis due to instability within our neighboring countries. Unlike 
Europe, however, we have much more space, a more powerful unified 
economy, and an inherent disposition to help others and be a “melting pot”. 
Therefore, to deny asylum seekers and people seeking to better their lives in 
the United States because they are coming from Latin and South American 
countries would be racist. Building a wall along the border would be a 
monument to that racism. 
Obviously, these are not thorough political or philosophical arguments, but they are likely 
the distilled versions of arguments we may hear from supporters of either party. 
Importantly though, these positions arise from CP, for if President Trump had never 
promised a wall, we might not have it as a symbol for constituents to develop as part of 
their world view. In fact, in the past there was bipartisan support for some border 
barricades so that there are some walls and fences along the US-Mexico border. Now that 
the issue has become symbolic, it may never be fully resolved. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CAMPIAGN PROMISES AND THEIR EFFECTS 
Now that we have some groundwork for the differences between CP and “standard” 
promises, it will be useful to consider the effects that they produce. First, consider the 
following set of promises:  
1. Read My Lips: No New Taxes  
2. I promise this will never happen again (as spoken by a Church leader) 
3. We will have affordable healthcare for all  
These all feel very similar to “standard” promises, and for reasons we will see in 
comparing these kinds of utterances to Searle’s Formulation, they are slightly different. 
Importantly, though, they are speech acts. They get us to believe that a certain politician 
holds a certain position, but also that the party or political group holds that position as 
well (we might be loath to call the Catholic church a political entity, but I think there are 
many good reasons to think that it is, the least of which being that it has agency over a 
sovereign nation). Further, if we are subscribers to that party’s view, it legitimizes our 
belief in certain things. It may also encourage us to engage in actions ourselves. 
Now that we can see how campaign promises work, and why they might be held to 
the same normative standards that “standard” promises are held to, it will now be useful 
to turn to how they ought to be evaluated from a deontic point of view. Put 
straightforwardly, a promise represents the most standard of obligations, such that if I 
promise to do something, I am obligating myself to perform that action and rendering 
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alternatives impermissible. However, if we interpret obligation as a two-way street (i.e. 
Op ↔ ⌐P ⌐p) some authors have argued that we can responsibly (or even be morally 
justified in) breaking our promises in pursuit of some other goal that is interpreted as 
overriding in some way morally. This, I believe applies to CP as well. In general, a 
politician’s promises obligates them to carry something out on behalf of their 
constituents28, and we would be right to criticize them morally if they outright failed to 
do so (viz. if a politician ran on making sidewalks more accessible, and then made no 
effort to do so once in office) but perhaps not when the promise is overridden in some 
way (i.e. in Bush Sr.’s case). Still, there is some additional responsibility conferred on the 
politician in the making of the promise. As we saw in the UFO case, information givers, 
such as the heads of organizations, can begin to wield immense power over their 
respective language-games, so much so that they can influence the actions of individuals 
just with the information they provide. Similarly, in promising, politicians perform a 
perlocutionary act, or one that produces “certain consequential effects on the feelings, 
thoughts, or actions of the audience.”29 Not only should we be evaluating what they say, 
in terms of its truth or falsity, whether or not they are successful in holding to their 
promises, but as thoughtful constituents and as responsible journalists, we should be 
evaluating the effects of their speech acts on the public. Merely in promising X, have they 
done something wrong? Have they incited riots, or sowed further divisions?  
                                                 
28 We might wonder, if given the framework that promises must be in some way in the interest of a party’s 
values or constituents, if a politician can promise something impermissible. Given the history of civilized 
nations, there is no doubt that some impermissible promises have been made, and it would be remiss of me 
to not acknowledge this possibility. However, I think what is impermissible for a politician to promise 
would depend largely on your normative view of morality. 
29 Austin, How to do Things with Words 101 
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To this end, it will be worthwhile to start with the work of Mcgowan, Haslanger and 
others in the area of “oppressive speech”. In her work Oppressive Speech, Mcgowan 
notes that we can see that certain utterances cause certain behaviors, but this is not always 
the best path to criticize these acts, “since these (alleged) causal effects are the result of 
persuasion and hence ‘mentally-mediated’, the speech causing them is highly protected 
by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”30 If we want to be able to criticize 
these kinds of utterances in a robust moral and perhaps legal way, we must be able to 
interpret them as actions and not merely speech. In her piece, Mcgowan gives an example 
of an employer making an utterance along the lines of “this establishment no longer 
serves non-white customers.” She notes that one of the results of this utterance is that 
new permissibility facts are enacted which contribute to the ongoing oppression of non-
whites in the community.31  Put another way, the utterance mentioned contributes to the 
fact that it is permissible to prevent non-whites to enter or partake in a certain 
establishment. Similarly, under the Austinian model, employers are institutionally 
supported in enacting rules (much like the pastor or priest would be the one to conduct 
marriages, or the parent to “baptize” an infant with a name) which would further 
oppression.   
In this case, Mcgowan is detailing an act that results from a special relationship, 
viz. employer to employees, that gives the speech its “act” status. To see this special 
relationship, it is useful to consider another approach. Perhaps in Mcgowan’s case, 
instead of the employer making the initial utterance, it is a customer. The customer makes 
                                                 
30 Mcgowan, Oppressive Speech §1 
31 Oppression for Mcgowan has specific conditions. See §2 of Oppressive Speech 
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a complaint to the management that the establishment is too crowded, and that some 
people should not be allowed entrance. This may cause management to enact new rules, 
but it is not the act of oppression itself.  
What, then, is the “special relationship” that political candidates have to their 
speech acts? Some are not in “power” when the performer promises, and some are. What 
is power as it pertains to the political world? I believe there are at least three ways we can 
understand the “act” component of a campaign promise. 
First, a campaign promise serves the function of endorsing a world view. When 
the elected head of the UFO convention refers to a certain image of a flash of light as a 
“cigar-shaped UFO”, she gives further credence to that term’s use in the language game 
of UFOs, much like the referee in an American Football game referring to a player 
crossing into the endzone with the ball in hand as a “touchdown”. I believe this is a 
process that can be considered something akin to “upkeep” or maintenance of the game. 
In uttering “touchdown”, the referee has contributed to the continued existence of the 
game.32 Similarly, a political candidate is in the unique position of being part of that 
party’s rules makers.  
The party platform, however, is a changeable object. Unlike chess, whose general 
rules seem to be relatively fixed throughout the history of the game, a party platform ebbs 
and flows based on what its members determine to be the relevant terms of discussion. 
This can take one of two (or perhaps more) forms. In the first, a party consensus grows 
                                                 
32 We could imagine that if the rules authority of a particular game were to continually refer to different 
events in different ways, the game would lack stability and existence. For example, if every time a ball was 
kicked through the uprights in American football it was referred to differently, perhaps “smekledorf- 1 
point” on one occasion, and “liliput-10 points” on another, it would be unclear if a game was being played 
anymore. Compare this to the often-untenable games made up by children. 
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around certain terms or positions being more valuable than others. For example, perhaps 
it is peacetime and military dominance has already been exerted around a nation’s 
neighbors. The right wing of that country may now decide that what is more important is 
to campaign on and advocate for stronger border enforcement. Another reason for this 
consensus-changing to take place may be that terms previously used are modified or 
appropriated for other purposes. Perhaps this same right-wing party, now in a time of 
relative stability, determines that “national security” no longer applies to having a 
powerful military fighting force, but a well-funded and armed police force to ensure that 
domestic violence and crime is minimized. This changing of terms occurs in other games 
as well, such as when the National Football League re-evaluates what it considers to be a 
“catch”, or when other sports grapple with what to consider a “performance enhancing 
drug”. 
Another way we might understand this is that when a politician promises 
something like a border wall, they contribute to that policy’s value in the eyes of certain 
people, mainly those within the party of the politician. If I subscribe to party x’s views 
and philosophies, and this statement is added to the platform, I may now view 
“maintaining borders” as more politically important than rendering aid to those crossing 
the border. 
Finally, we may see these kinds of speech acts as endorsing or encouraging 
certain types of action by individuals. One example may be the rise of the Arizona 
Minutemen, a civilian militia that patrolled the border in the early 2000’s. 
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CHAPTER 8 
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
Over the course of this paper, I have argued that Campaign Promises are either a 
unique speech act or a mode of a certain kind of speech-act (viz. promises). But what of 
the speech act-denier, or the speech-act minimalist? What could they argue for instead to 
better explain the phenomena I am trying to capture here? 
Let us start with the speech-act denier, who might argue like Cohen did in “Do 
Illocutionary Forces Exist?” that “wherever explicitly performative expressions are used, 
the illocutionary force, if such a thing exists at all, cannot be distinguished from the 
meaning”.33 This may prove a difficult course to take, especially in the cases of baptisms 
and coronations and other events so well documented by Austin and others, but we can 
imagine the philosopher who is interested in promises merely for their moral content and 
the obligations that they seem to generate. They understand promises in the way 
symbolized earlier, so that  
1. I promise to meet you for lunch 
Becomes 
A. OL ↔ ⌐P ⌐L 
Or I am obligated now to meet you for lunch if and only if it is not permissible for me to 
not meet you for lunch.34 This formulation is necessary for our understanding of promises 
in the moral sense since it represents where debates in morality frequently arise. Some 
                                                 
33 Cohen, Do Illocutionary Forces Exist 122 Phil Quarterly 
34 This explains things like overridingness, and why we are apt to forgive in the face of countervailing 
reasons. I.e. my father was dying so I went to see him, I was permitted to do something else, therefore I am 
no longer obligated to keep my promise. 
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theorists may argue that there is nothing that we can add to the right side of this 
conditional (i.e. no moral reasons to do anything else) that would enable us to escape our 
obligations, and others may provide a framework for how other actions may become 
permissible. Campaign promises behave somewhat differently when analyzed through 
this lens. To see this, I believe a clause of Searle’s argument is necessary to reproduce 
here: 
4. The hearer would prefer that A is performed to its not being performed, and the 
Speaker believes that the hearer will benefit from A. 
I believe that the speech-act denier would also hold something similar, namely 4*: 
 4*. A promise must be something that the promisee would desire, otherwise an 
obligation would fail to generate. 
Without something like 4*, a moral or language theory would fail to correctly 
differentiate between promises and threats, which would seem to be problematic.  Armed 
with 4*, however, the speech-act denier may have all the tools they need to sort out 
political promises. They might note that the real problem lies not in vagueness or 
ambiguity, but rather the conflict between individual and collective rationality. It may 
very well be the case that the average citizen would desire the result of a promise like “I 
promise that no citizen will have to pay to ride on public transit”. Upon getting into 
office, the utterer of this promise may realize that the only way to uphold this promise 
would be to eliminate public transit entirely. What are we to say about this case, from the 
perspective of the strict moralist? Is it that the politician promised wrongly, or that those 
citizens who are upset that the promise can no longer be upheld are somehow being 
irrational in not recognizing these reasons that may override? 
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 I believe some in ethics would hold the latter, that some agents are just failing to 
recognize all the reasons in the situation, much like if I had broken a promise to meet for 
lunch because my daughter was in immediate need of my aid to prevent her death.35 
Surely, they would argue, I had more reason to try to save my daughter than to meet for 
lunch, and for anyone to hold me accountable for the lunch meeting would be either 
irrational or immoral. Some theorists, strict deontologists perhaps, may account for the 
feelings of those in the latter case by saying any promise broken is, in fact, immoral.36 
Neither of these theories are truly equipped to answer the former question, even with the 
adaption of 4*, viz. has someone done something wrong or objectionable merely in the 
promising? Without some inefficient and ultimately ad-hoc approach37, the speech-act-
denier moralist does not have access to the tools that Mcgowan does in describing 
oppressive speech, and further does not possess them for the purposes of CP. 
 If this explains why the speech-act-denier is ill-equipped to respond to and 
account for CP, what about someone who may hold that speech-acts exist, but campaign 
promises are simply not distinct enough from standard promises to justify the existence 
of a “new” speech act? As my analysis of Searle has shown, not only do political 
promises differ in his more analytic approach, I think political promises fulfill a ritualistic 
                                                 
35 For a view like this, see Portmore’s Commonsense Consequentialism. 
36 I believe we can imagine a Kantian holding this view, namely that any promise not kept is failing to 
uphold the Categorical Imperative. 
37 Take the following scenario: imagine a professor is nominated for a national award that will make her 
life significantly better (perhaps there is some financial component). This professor, in an attempt to secure 
this award, makes the promise that she will end her practice of requiring work outside the classroom for a 
whole semester. Now we can imagine a number of consequences of this action that might be negative, such 
as students harassing other students in order to get them to vote a certain way or preventing students from 
voting at the “polls” who they don’t trust and so on. We can also imagine those consequences never 
materializing. In both cases, I believe that most ethical theories are ineffectual at capturing the risk of this 
utterance.  
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function that standard promises simply don't explain. To "run" for office is to make some 
of these specialized kinds of promises, on purpose or otherwise. This is because to 
campaign for political office is to offer some sort of vision for which electors or voters 
can approve or disapprove; for example, an adherence to the status quo or a divergence 
from it. For an individual to campaign without offering anything explicitly or implicitly 
would be little different for voters than writing in “Bugs Bunny” on their ballot in protest. 
A primitive society may have no use for political promises but may engage in standard 
promising all the time. 
 
CHAPTER 9 
PROMISING TO TRY 
Another objection to my view of political or campaign promises as uniquely 
interesting kinds of speech acts may hold a view similar to this one: “…a person can do 
nothing more than to try (or, more precisely, a person can do nothing more than to try his 
or her best). And so it seems that the phrase I promise should always be read as elliptical 
for I promise to try: to promise anything more would be irresponsible.”38 They might 
note that reasonable people should always take political promises as “promises to try”, 
since on the evidentialist view of promises (namely, that we would be irresponsible to 
promise things that we didn’t think we had good evidence that that thing would come to 
fruition) a majority of political promises are not the kinds of things that we have good 
evidence for. As I have noted in previous descriptions, political promises are often the 
kinds of things that individuals lack influence to fully bring about, since most 
                                                 
38 Promising to Try, Jason D’Cruz and Justin Kalef 
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governments have some delineation of power. As such, politicians must realize that they 
lack the “sufficient evidence” that they can guarantee something will come about, such as 
new roads, lower tax rates, and so on. If we did not give them the out to “promise to try”, 
as these theorists might argue, we would have to consider them all irresponsible. They 
might say that my machinery is not necessary, because if any negative effects arise from 
these kinds of promises, it is because they are irresponsible. 
I think there are two questions to unpack here, first, are politicians “promising to 
try”, and is irresponsibility enough to explain the effects I have described. I believe that 
in some cases, there are assumed “promises to try”, especially in less polarized or smaller 
political environments (town councils, school boards, etc.) where there might be some 
incentive to appear bi-partisan. “We hope to work together to find a solution” is often a 
phrase bandied about in these scenarios, and I believe we can subsume this kind of 
utterance under the heading of a promise to try. However, in larger, more partisan 
environments, a “promise to try” is just not enough to sway the minds of voters. I tend to 
agree with Berislav Marušić’s position on certain promises to try, as he describes in the 
wartime lover case.39 In this case, a soldier goes off to war, and their lover is left behind. 
They are then faced with a dilemma whether to promise to remain faithful in the absence 
of the significant other, since they know that most are not successful in keeping this kind 
of promise, but a promise to try is somehow not “felicitous” enough (in the words of 
Austin) to be appropriate for the situation. D’Cruz and Kalef respond by asking the 
following questions: 
                                                 
39 Berislav Marušić, “Promising against the Evidence,” Ethics 123 (2013): 292–317 
  44 
But what if the lover promises to try her utmost and really means it? Is she really 
insufficiently committed, and if so, what more can one ask? Why should the 
departing lover who is offered a promise to try be dissatisfied? What is the source 
of his discontent, and is it fair to insist on anything more? 
While they fail specifically to address the intuition that a “promise to try” in this situation 
is somehow insufficient in favor of describing why it would be irresponsible to make this 
kind of promise, the insinuation here is clear: everyone should feel satisfied with a 
promise to try in the scenario (everything being held equal).40  
I don’t think a promise to try in this scenario is satisfying simply because statistics are not 
always the best indicator of success in individual cases. They may serve as a reason in 
part of the greater moral calculus, but to state that something is difficult or unlikely on 
the basis of other couples who have experienced the same thing only serves as a reason 
for the promisor to want to give that kind of commitment, and the promisee to desire it. 
The move that D’Cruz and Kalef make seems to rob the promisor of agency in a way that 
does not happen in other cases they mention. I agree, for example, that it would make 
sense for the Olympic athlete to retreat to a promise to try, since they do not have control 
over their competition. Yet a promise to remain faithful is much unlike this, we would 
not let a spouse off the hook if they were to point out that “the competition was more 
attractive”. As actuaries we might find a lover’s promise to a wartime soldier 
irresponsible, as philosophers we ought to respect the agency of individuals. 
                                                 
40 Importantly, CP is not always responsive to this concept. While it is certainly evident that Bush Sr. 
resisted allowing new taxes as best he could, he ultimately approved new taxes and was held accountable 
for doing so.  
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The second question to answer is whether or not the concept of an irresponsible promise 
is enough to explain the effects that I have described. Is it the case that we can criticize 
politicians merely for being irresponsible when their speech-acts result in the production 
of some negative effect? While irresponsibility may be able to account for riots, protests 
and the like, I do not think responsibility alone is what accounts for the Mcgowan-esque 
legitimizing of beliefs. When I speed down a road, I am being irresponsible in that I 
could hurt someone or myself. This irresponsibility though, cannot be said to be the 
source of others speeding. Likewise, if I promise to end global warming, I am 
irresponsible in that I may be saying something to secure your vote, but that 
irresponsibility can’t account for you to come to the realization that global warming is 
bad or that others who don’t agree with my promise are somehow confused about what is 
important. 
 
CHAPTER 10 
BREAKING PROMISES 
Very early in this paper I noted that promises, campaign or otherwise, may 
sometimes be broken. When I first deployed the notion, I thought it went without much 
argumentation that promises are broken and that is generally thought to be the fault of the 
promisor. I have been privileged to work with great advisors on this topic and have 
explored the relevant research to realize that the breaking of a promise is a complex issue, 
and one can not necessarily be said to have broken a promise simply by noting that the 
thing promised has not come to fruition. Since “breaking” seems to imply some 
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fundamental moral failure, it will be useful to step back, suggest possible promise 
misfires, and decide which have “broken” and which have merely missed their mark. 
Promises of Vagueness 
1. I promise to do my best (as the Olympic athlete says to her young child in the 
D’Cruz piece) 
2. I promise to drive safely (as said by the student heading off to college) 
3. I promise this property is the best value for your money (as said by the real estate 
agent to a prospective home buyer) 
All these promises rest on some element of vagueness, as “best”, “safe” and “value” 
are all terms of rather imprecise meaning. An Olympic athlete, for example, may not be 
able to accurately assess what her “best” is on any particular day, let alone demonstrate to 
someone else that her best was given.41 The real estate agent example, appears to be a 
fairly common utterance but may not rise to the level of “promise” given the strict 
philosophical definition I have appropriated from Searle (although may still entail legal 
obligation). Still, we can imagine a home buyer lamenting that their real estate agent had 
promised them something more than the lemon they ended up in.  
These kinds of promises, however, due to their impreciseness, are very hard to 
“break”. Even when the outcome does not strictly come about, i.e. the college-bound 
student gets in an accident or the athlete fails to beat even their personal best in a 40-yard 
dash, there is a sense in which their promise was kept and the negative outcome that 
                                                 
41 A 40-yard dash runner may have a personal best time that they are always aspiring to beat. However, 
even failing to reach this personal best may not represent a failure to do one’s best, as there may be 
imperceptible factors that limit one’s ability, such as shoe wear, track condition, weather and so on. 
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resulted was otherwise unavoidable. We may give some wiggle room to these kinds of 
promises, even when it is clear that the promisor is not or has not done everything to 
ensure that it comes to be. The real estate agent may have done a standard home 
inspection, but maybe they didn’t do research of past pest issues to find that the home is 
near the epicenter of a stubborn scorpion infestation. The new home owner may 
recognize that the home is still valuable but presents new challenges that they wished 
they would have known about. 
To break one of these kinds of promises, then, requires one to fail to bring about a 
promised outcome in what Austin refers to as aggravation, such as deliberately or on 
purpose.42 The student who hits a pedestrian while texting and driving is not only failing 
to keep their promise to drive safely, they are engaging in behavior that is unsafe. The 
athlete who fails to train before a big race and decides not to participate the day of the 
race is deliberately not doing their best.  
Still, there is a wide gulf between these assessments, and rarely do our practical 
experiences line up in such a way that we can say a promise of this type is fulfilled or 
broken. This represents a problem for moral assessments in applied ethics, since we may 
not be able to criticize those who skirt the boundaries of failing to uphold a promise. 
However, with speech-act theory we are better equipped to explain that there can be 
negative effects produced from these kinds of promises, even if the question of moral 
blameworthiness is unclear. 
Overridden Promises 
1. I promise to meet you at Charlie’s (uttered a day before Charlie’s burns down) 
                                                 
42 Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 177 
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2. I promise to take you to the movies (uttered a minute before a life-threatening 
injury inflicts the promisee) 
3. I promise to be nicer to Beth (uttered a week before Beth and the promisee stop 
being friends) 
Some promises must fail to come to fruition. In Charlie’s case, there are factors beyond 
the promisor’s control which prevent the promisor from carrying out what was previously 
guaranteed. Even for those theorists who might think there is no way to justify the moral 
wrongness of a promise going unfilled, they would likely have to admit that in those 
cases in which empirical facts stand in the way they must make an exception. Here, a 
promise is cancelled out rather than strictly “broken”. In (2), we have a case where what I 
have most reason to do, rationally and morally, is not to fulfill my promise. It would be 
worse for you if you were to attend a movie instead of the hospital, and I think many 
would see me as culpable for your death if I failed to do so (and you died as a result). 
Still, imagining the extreme promise-theorist43, they might argue that in some way the 
world is worse off for being one in which a promise was broken. This would appear to be 
an aesthetic argument more than a moral one, and we can be confident in (2) being an 
example of overriding moral duty in most theories. The final promise is one that might be 
said to have misfired, i.e. the promisee’s desires have changed before the promise was to 
be fulfilled. Beth’s former friend might not want anyone to be nice to Beth now, just as 
the person who asked their spouse to bring home dinner might no longer want what is 
provided since there was a surprise work outing. Importantly, in these cases, it is the 
                                                 
43 The promise-theorist referred to here is not any author, rather is addressing some extreme positions I 
have taken in other work. 
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promisee’s preferences that have changed, and not the promisor’s. We likely would not 
be as sympathetic to the promisor if they found it harder to be nicer to Beth than they 
expected. 
Standard Promises 
1. I promise to take the trash out. 
2. I promise to meet you at Charlie’s at 8. 
3. I promise I will pay you back. 
These kinds of promises are the ones most susceptible to breaking, although given 
sufficient moral or rational reasons, we may see any of these promises make the list of 
those overridden. Promises like 1-3 leave little space for misfire or “misadventure” that 
arise from promises of vagueness discussed earlier. Either the trash was taken out, or 
there was good reason that the promise was overridden. However, we can imagine some 
edge cases, perhaps you took the trash out, but forgot a bag, or you met your promisee at 
Charlie’s, but fifteen minutes late. To evaluate these kinds of promises morally reveals a 
straightforward demonstration of the creation of specific obligations and how we hold 
individuals accountable for failing to meet those obligations. Even in those situations 
where an obligation is not strictly failed, i.e. paying someone back, but weeks later than 
expected, we still may feel some disappointment in the promisee for making a promise 
came to fruition in a less than ideal way. These kinds of perlocutionary effects are the 
kinds outlined by authors of Speech-Act theory, such as Mcgowan, Austin, Searle, 
Haslanger and others. In this way, one is availed of the “filling” in of the descriptions of 
our feelings of these kinds of promises. 
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Campaign Promises 
1. Read My Lips: No New Taxes 
2. With your support, we can fix our ailing public transportation system. 
3. Make America Great Again! 
As we have already explored, these kinds of promises are resistant to the kinds of 
language we typically associate with promises. Due to their peculiar formation, we might 
think that they are especially resistant to breaking, and that parties to these promises who 
have good reason to think that any concerted effort toward their fulfillment was sufficient 
for their success, much like in the promises of vagueness discussed earlier. Admittedly, 
promises like (1) appear to have a very specific outcome in mind, but even these more 
specific promises seem resistant to becoming overridden promises. This, I believe, is a 
result of the fact that these kinds of speech act are uniquely powerful in the production of 
perlocutionary effects, such that the kinds of belief they engender are resistant to reasons. 
This point deserves further analysis. For a moment, let’s imagine a supporter of 
Bush Sr. who votes for him largely on the basis of (1). This individual’s driving political 
beliefs are that government should be small and that taxes are not only a way of 
increasing the size of government, but of taking money from those who are entitled to it 
and giving it to those who are not (admittedly, not the soundest belief system). Perhaps 
they rely on some government services, they drive on roads, rely on the police and 
military for protection and so on but do not feel that they derive any direct service from 
the government (again, a quasi-misguided belief) so that any additional taxation beyond 
what is already in place is superfluous. The promise that Bush has made enables this 
agent to feel so justified in this view of politics and government that the elimination of 
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new taxes becomes their overriding belief, so much so that they may discount the value 
of other services when presented with their elimination. More specifically, we can 
imagine some rudimentary deliberation process carried out by Bush that went something 
like this: 
I have promised no new taxes, and I believe that additional taxes are harmful to 
the growth of our economy and thereby the wealth of our nation, but if I continue 
to resist new taxes, important priorities to myself and the party will falter, like the 
military. Since my reasons to support those other things outweighs the reason to 
keep my promise, I will break my promise and raise taxes. 
Obviously, Bush’s real deliberative process involved a myriad of other factors, but we 
can see that this promise was overridden because it no longer seemed valuable, just like a 
promise to keep a diet would be discarded if the diet was revealed to be causing real 
lasting damage to an individual. We might wonder if Bush thought that his supporters 
would follow a similar deliberative scheme and arrive at the same conclusion. I believe 
that due to the perlocutionary effects of a campaign promise, the deliberative process of 
promisees is corrupted. For example: 
Bush promised no new taxes and now is entertaining the idea because he says 
government services will suffer if we do not raise government revenues. Bush 
says that even the military will suffer. Well, I am a big supporter of the military, 
but maybe we don’t need such a big military budget anymore now that the Cold 
War is over. Besides, he promised. 
I think this kind of updating of preferences happens all the time with regards to politics, 
in most cases because those preferences don’t manifest themselves in a direct way in our 
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everyday lives. Men sometimes have strong opinions on abortion, and the rich often have 
strong opinions on the structure of welfare, for example. Whatever the process, these 
beliefs are entrenched in ways that are similar to what other philosophers have identified. 
Importantly, however, I believe they have missed the connection between the 
perlocutionary effect of a speech act contributing to or even enabling a continued 
resistance to countervailing reasons. 
 
CHAPTER 11 
CLOSING REMARKS 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued for the existence of a specific speech act that 
behaves in many ways like one we are very familiar with but is in many ways different 
from a typical act of promising. I have demonstrated that political groups often function 
in the same way that language games do, and we ought to observe the differences 
between groups when trying to bridge the gap in discourse. I have shown how Campaign 
Promises might do more work for us in terms of explaining the effects of certain political 
speech acts than other moral or political theories on their own. Finally, I have discussed 
what it means to “break” a promise in ordinary language and moral philosophy and hope 
that those mechanisms provide a framework for continued discussion on the issue. 
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